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Abstract: We propose a multidimensional spatial model to evaluate the well-being using the 
Better Life Index (BLI) in 36 countries according to a two-steps procedure. First, we position 
the countries as points in the Euclidean K-dimensional space in which each dimension is a 
specific aspect of well-being as measured in the BLI. Second, we consider each 
individual/voter’s opinions on the same dimensions to calculate the personal optimal point in 
that same K-dimensional space. Hence, we measure the distance between optimal point of 
well-being and the actual observed point at individual level. This distance is interpreted as 
the individuals’ loss in well-being. We show that this loss is negatively related (i) to the overall 
well-being in terms of BLI and (ii) the main indices of quality of democracy. 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays there is a general consensus about the limits of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in the prediction of societal well-being. This point has been largely discussed in the literature 
(among others, UNDP, 1996; Fleurbaey, 2009; Stiglitz et al., 2010; Frey and Stutzer, 2010; Bleys, 
2012; Fioramonti, 2013; Costanza et al., 2014; De Beukelaer, 2014; Coyle, 2014; Karabell, 2014;  
Costanza et al., 2016). UNDP (1996), in particular, identifies five main critical aspects related 
to the measurement of economic performance in terms of GDP growth: ‘jobless growth’, 
‘voiceless growth’, ‘ruthless growth’, ‘rootless growth’, and ‘futureless growth’. Building 
upon the ongoing criticism, an increasing number of multidimensional measures of well-
being has been proposed by the main international institutions (Costanza et al. 2014; 2016). 
Among them, the Human Development Index launched by the UNDP in 1990, and the Better 
Life Index (BLI) proposed by the OECD in 2011 have gained momentum.  
We propose to consider the multidimensional measures of well-being as points in a Euclidean 
multidimensional space. Undeniably, the actual positioning of countries in the 
aforementioned multidimensional space depends on both structural factors and on the policy 
mix designed and implemented by each country at various levels of government. One can 
argue that the former represent a common framework in which different policy makers could 
and do act. Therefore, under the assumption that citizens are aware of the limitations arising 
from the structural characteristics, it makes sense to focus on the policy’s effects in order to 
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tackle differences in well-being as measured by multidimensional indices. Put differently, 
given a structural constraint, the policy makers act in providing a specific discretionary 
proportion among the single dimensions of well-being (mix of well-being), one that can be 
compared to citizens/voters’ optimal subjective mix of well-being. For instance, in the same 
country, there could be a relevant share of people interested in a specific aspect of well-being, 
such as health care, and at the same time, there could be policy makers that are devoting more 
resources in education than in health1. This analysis proposes a methodological contribution 
to test to what extent people’s preferences among the different dimensions of well-being 
match with the policy makers’ supply, as measured in the OECD BLI framework. 
A widely used model to study these phenomena is the spatial model of preferences 
(Bogomolnaia, Laslier, 2007). The multidimensional spatial models have been extensively 
used to study the electoral competition (Eguia, 2011), and to the best of our knowledge this is 
the first application in the context of multidimensional well-being. In a multidimensional 
spatial perspective, we consider the OECD countries as objects of preferences. In the BLI 
framework, the countries are points in the Euclidean K-dimensional space, in which each 
dimension is a specific aspect of well-being. Each individual/voter is characterized by her 
ideal point in that same space. For each individual the distance between its optimal mix of 
well-being, and the mix provided by policy makers can be interpreted as individual loss in 
well-being. In other words, the higher the distance between citizens’ optimal mix and the mix 
provided by the policy maker, the lower the level of individual well-being. Therefore, the 
countries can be judged as good as they are close to the voters’ ideal points. 
There are two main reasons why the OECD BLI is particularly suitable for this kind of 
analysis. First, since it contains 24 variables related to 11 different topics, it is one of the largest 
dataset collecting well-being data at country level (Patrizii et al. 2017). Second, in the 
dedicated web-site2, OECD provides a survey of the user weightings related to the 11 topics. 
Therefore, OECD currently has the most extensive survey about the subjective optimal mix 
(or ideal points) of well-being. Building upon this dataset, we propose to interpret the country-
level citizens’ individual weightings, as the optimal subjective mix of well-being, and we 
propose to interpret the country-level proportions among the performances in the topics, as 
the mix of well-being provided by policy makers, given the structural constraint. With these 
assumptions, we propose to empirically asses the country-level societal loss of well-being, by 
estimating, for each country included in the OECD survey, the distance between these mixes. 
By means of four different specifications of societal loss functions at country level, we show 
that the societal loss due to the mismatching between the will of the people and policy makers’ 
activity, is negatively related with the main indices of quality of democracy taken from the 
World Happiness Indicator (Helliwell et al. 2016), and from the Worldwide Governance 
                                                     
1 Of course, the final outcome will depend also on the efficiency levels.  
2 www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org 
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Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2011). Moreover, we show that countries with more mismatching 
are also countries with lower levels of Better Life Index. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the Better Life Index and 
presents our dataset; Section 3 explains our multidimensional spatial model and our societal 
loss function; in Section 4 we show the results; Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Better Life Index 
The BLI proposed by OECD in 2011 builds upon Stiglitz et al. (2010)’s claim that the well-
being is multidimensional, and, therefore, it should be measured considering simultaneously 
more than one indicator. The BLI is composed by eleven topics, some of them measured with 
a single variable and some others measured with a simple average of two or more related 
variables. The Table 1 describes the composition, in terms of original variables, of each topic.  
Table 1: Topics and related variables of the BLI 
Topics  Related variables 
Housing 
 Dwellings without basic facilities (N) 
 Housing expenditure (N) 
 Rooms per person (P) 
Income 
 Household net adjusted disposable income (P) 
 Household net financial wealth (P) 
Jobs 
 Employment rate (P) 
 Job security (N) 
 Long-term unemployment rate (N) 
 Personal earnings (P) 
Community  Quality of support network (P) 
Education 
 Educational attainment (P) 
 Student skills (P) 
 Years in education (P) 
Environment 
 Air pollution (N) 
 Water quality (P) 
Civic engagement 
 Consultation on rule-making (P) 
 Voter turnout (P) 
Health 
 Life expectancy (P) 
 Self-reported health (P) 
Life Satisfaction  Life satisfaction (P) 
Safety 
 Assault rate (N) 
 Homicide rate (N) 
Work-Life Balance 
 Employees working very long hours (N) 
 Time devoted to leisure and personal care (P) 
 
In the BLI original variables, there are positive (P), such as ‘Rooms per person’, and negative 
(N), such as ‘Dwellings without basic facilities’, measures of well-being (Table 1Table 1). 
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Online data3 originated from the row data have been transformed and aggregated according 
to the following procedures: (1) normalization called ‘min max method’ (Nardo et al. 2008), 
(2) translation applied to negative variables (variables with N in Table 1), and (3) aggregation: 
(𝟏) 𝑵𝒐𝒓𝒎 =  (
𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 − 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆
𝒎𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 − 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆
)×𝟏𝟎 
(2) 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = (1 − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚) 
(3) 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘 = (
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
), 𝑘 = 1, … 𝐾 
The final database covers 36 Countries over 11 topics. The Table 2Table 2 summarises the 
descriptive statistics of the scores for each topic.  
Table 2. Summary of the topic values  
Topic Average StDev Min Max 
Housing 5.51 1.48 2.06 8.21 
Income 3.40 2.22 0.13 10 
Jobs 6.54 1.85 1.49 9.53 
Community 7.35 2.12 0 10 
Education 6.40 1.93 0.52 9.13 
Environment 6.78 1.99 2.07 9.62 
Civic engagement 5.07 1.93 0 9.47 
Health 6.83 1.95 0.58 9.35 
Life Satisfaction 6.60 2.92 0 10 
Safety 8.30 1.93 0.42 9.96 
Work-Life Balance 6.66 1.88 0 9.77 
Data extracted on 17 Feb 2016 10:40 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat;  
 
As mentioned, for the purpose of our analysis we propose to measure the well-being in terms 
of the performance according to a bundle of dimensions.  Consequently, we proceed to an 
additional normalization on the topics values: 
(4) 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚_𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘 = (
𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
) , 𝑘 = 1, … 𝐾 
 
in order for each country to have the same total amount of BLI. Put differently, since each 
topic has been further normalised along the cross-section dimension, our distance measure 
does not depends on the total amount; rather it depends only on the mix of well-being (i.e. the 
proportions among the topics).  
                                                     
3 www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org 
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As mentioned, in the dedicate website, people can express their opinion on each topic by 
rating the topics according to their personal value judgment. The ratings are in a score that is 
in the interval [0,5]. For each of the person expressing opinion, the website builds its own BLI, 
with an algorithm that estimates the weighted average of country level values of the topics 
(performances) multiplied by the subjective scores (value judgments). This algorithm allows 
the visitors to see in real time how the BLI rank changes with the change in the score associated 
to the topics. Starting from 2011, more than 100,000 users of the Better Life Index around the 
world have shared their views and the OECD has collected this data. The microdata can be 
downloaded and in addition to the individual well-being ratings, they show the territorial 
origin of the visitors, i.e. the country4. We have in total 92,980 individual preferences from all 
the 36 Countries where the BLI is measured (we do not consider the preferences from the 
countries not included in BLI dataset). In Table 3, the descriptive statistics for the weights are 
reported. Some information, about the perceived trade off, can be seen in the average and 
median ratings (second and third column in Table 3). On this point ‘Civic engagement’ is, 
globally, the lowest preferred topic describing the well-being, while ‘Education’, ‘Health’, 
‘Life Satisfaction’, and ‘Work-Life Balance’ have the highest average and median values. 
Table 3: Summary of the Weights for each Topic 
 Average Median StDev Min Max 
Housing 3.18 3 1.35 0 5 
Income 3.10 3 1.39 0 5 
Jobs 3.22 3 1.40 0 5 
Community 2.94 3 1.44 0 5 
Education 3.57 4 1.46 0 5 
Environment 3.30 3 1.47 0 5 
Civic engagement 2.42 2 1.41 0 5 
Health 3.77 4 1.40 0 5 
Life Satisfaction 3.76 4 1.45 0 5 
Safety 3.32 4 1.48 0 5 
Work-Life Balance 3.39 4 1.48 0 5 
Data extracted on 17-18 Feb 2016 from OECD.Stat 
 
In order to compare the topic values in (4) with the individual weights, we normalize the 
topic in the interval [0,5] as the weights. These weights will be used in the measurement of 
the loss function described in the following section.  
3. The societal loss function 
The use of societal loss function stems from the original (unidimensional) spatial model 
presented in the Hotelling (1929)’s seminal work. Following to Hotelling (1929)’s contribution 
Downs (1957), for the first time, used a spatial model in a democratic political competition 
                                                     
4 Our micro data have been downloaded the days 17th-18th February 2016. 
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context before Davis et al. (1972) introduced the first multidimensional spatial model to study 
political competition over multiple policy issues. More precisely, it is worth recalling that in 
the model proposed by Davis et al. (1972) each policy issue correspond to a dimension in a 
vector space. The standard approach in political economy is to assume that agents 
(individuals and policy makers) have an ideal policy represented by a point in the vector 
space.  
Hence, in line with Downs (1957) let us start with a unidimensional policy space, in which the 
𝑖-th citizen has a policy preference 𝑔𝑖. According to the 𝑗-th country where she/he lives, the 
citizen has a disutility proportional to the distance between the policy 𝑔𝑗 implemented in the 
country 𝑗, and its own preference:  
(5) 𝑈𝑖(𝑔
𝑗) = −𝑑(𝑔𝑗, 𝑔𝑖) 
Following the axiomatic foundation provided in Eguia (2011), in a 𝐾-dimensional policy space 
the individual disutility on the implemented policy 𝑔𝑗 can be expressed by: 
(6) 𝑈𝑖(𝒈
𝑗) = −𝑑𝛿(𝒈𝑗, 𝒈𝑖) = (∑|𝑔𝑘
𝑗 − 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 |
𝛿
𝐾
𝑘=1
)
1
𝛿⁄
 
The parameter δ represents the agent’s sensitivity to policies different from her preferred mix.  
To this regard it is worth noticing that while for values of δ≥1 the function (6) is a Minkowski 
(1886) metric, with δ<1 the function (5) is not a metric because it violates the triangle inequality 
(Eguia, 2011). In the extant literature (Kramer, 1977; Enelow, Hinich, 1981; Feddersen, 1992; 
Schofield, Sened, 2006; Schofield, 2007; Hortala-Vallve, Esteve-Volart, 2011), the preferences 
on the different policies have been expressed by quadratic utility (distance) function or, more 
generally, concave in the Euclidean distance to the ideal point of the agent (Eguia, 2011). 
Consistently with this practice we adopt two different distance functions with δ≥1. Namely, 
the Euclidean  𝛿 = 2 and the taxicab 𝛿 = 1.  
In order to aggregate the individual loss function at country level, a decision must be taken 
about the social welfare function. On the point two extreme views have been proposed: the 
Bentham Utilitarianism (Bentham, 1789), and the Rawlsian (Rawls, 1971). According to the 
Benthamian approach the social welfare function is given by the sum of the individual 
utilities. Therefore, the function conceptually accepts a complete trade-off (or compensability) 
among individual utilities. In our case, for the country 𝑗 the societal loss function for the 
implemented policy 𝑔𝑗 is: 
(7) 𝑈𝑗
𝐵(𝑔𝑗) = ∑ 𝑈𝑖(𝑔
𝑗)
𝑖
= ∑ −𝑑(𝒈𝑗 , 𝒈𝑖)
𝑖
 
where 𝑈𝑗
𝐵(𝑔𝑗) is the Bentham societal disutility for the policy 𝑔𝑗, and 𝑈𝑖(𝑔
𝑗) are the individual 
disutility proposed in (6). This is the approach used in Smith (2000) to compare the outcomes 
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of different election methods. Since we have a differentiated dataset where the number of 
voters changes among the different countries, we propose to measure the Bentham country-
level disutility as the average loss function (average loss per preference): 
(8) 𝑈𝑗
𝐵(𝒈𝑗) =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑈𝑖(𝒈
𝑗)
𝑖
=
1
𝑛
∑ −𝑑(𝒈𝑗 , 𝒈𝑖)
𝑖
 
where 𝑛 is the number of voters in the country 𝑗. 
In the Rawlsian approach instead, the social utility function is given by the minimum of the 
individual utilities. In our case, therefore, for the country 𝑗 the societal loss function for the 
implemented policy 𝑔𝑗 is equal to the maximum value achieved by the distance function: 
(9) 𝑈𝑗
𝑅(𝒈𝑗) = min
𝑖=1,…,𝑛
𝑈𝑖(𝒈
𝑗) = max
𝑖=1,…,𝑛
𝑑(𝒈𝑗, 𝒈𝑖) 
where 𝑈𝑗
𝑅(𝒈) is the Rawlsian societal disutility for the policy 𝒈𝑗, and 𝑈𝑖(𝒈
𝑗) are the individual 
disutilities as proposed in (6). In other words, the Rawls country-level disutility is given by 
the disutility of the less happy citizen (maxi-min method). 
The following section presents an analysis of the societal loss of well-being according to both 
the Benthamian and the Rawlsian approach.  
An alternative new way to measure the well-being on BLI at country-level, is treating all the 
individuals as a unique global community and evaluating the policy makers’ offer in terms of 
mix of well-being, on the basis of the global societal favourite country. Denoting by 𝑔𝑗 the mix 
of well-being in the country 𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, . . , 𝑚), then for the individual 𝑖, the favourite country in 
the set is the country that minimizes her loss function: 
(10) max
𝑗=1,…,𝑚
𝑈𝑖(𝑔
𝑗) = min
𝑗=1,…,𝑚
𝑑𝛿(𝑔𝑗, 𝑔𝑖) = min
𝑗=1,..,𝑚
(∑|𝑔𝑘
𝑗 − 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 |
𝛿
𝐾
𝑘=1
)
1
𝛿⁄
 
Moreover, we can find the least favourite country for the individual 𝑖, as the country that 
maximizes her loss function:  
(11) min
𝑗=1,…,𝑚
𝑈𝑖(𝑔
𝑗) = max
𝑗=1,…,𝑚
𝑑𝛿(𝑔𝑗, 𝑔𝑖) = max
𝑗=1,…,𝑚
(∑|𝑔𝑘
𝑗 − 𝑔𝑘
𝑖 |
𝛿
𝐾
𝑘=1
)
1
𝛿⁄
 
By adopting such a global lens, we can evaluate the countries on the basis of the share of 
people that ranks the country first and last. 
4. Results 
As explained in the Section 3, in order to estimate the aggregate societal loss of well-being in 
the OECD countries we express the individual disutility in two different ways: (i) the 
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Euclidean distance, and (ii) the taxicab norm. Moreover, we express the societal loss of well-
being with two different aggregations of individual loss functions: the Benthamian societal 
welfare function (eq. 8), and the Rawlsian social welfare function (eq. 9). As a result of the 
combination between distance function and aggregate social loss we obtain four different 
values of social loss for each country. These results are reported in Section 4.1; then, in Section 
4.2, we contrast the above loss values with three different indicators of ‘voice’ taken from the 
World Happiness Indicator (Helliwell et al. 2016), and from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2011). Furthermore, in Section 4.3 we compare our loss function 
with different composite indices of well-being from BLI; and finally (in Section 4.4) we to 
compare the country level BLI by minimizing the individual loss functions. 
4.1. The societal loss of Better Life Index 
As mentioned, in this section four societal loss functions are presented: 1. the individual 
taxicab aggregated with the Benthamian approach, 2. the individual taxicab aggregated with 
the Rawlsian approach, 3. the individual Euclidean aggregated with the Benthamian 
approach, and 4. the individual Euclidean aggregated with the Rawlsian approach. Table 4 
reports the country-level societal loss5 due to mismatching between the individually optimal 
mix of well-being and the mix of well-being provided by the policy makers at country level. 
It is worth noticing that the highest societal loss is registered in Turkey regardless of both the 
functional forms and the aggregation techniques. The aggregation technique, however, plays 
a role in determining the second highest societal loss. With both taxicab and Euclidean 
individual distance function while the second highest loss is achieved by Mexico according to 
the Benthamian aggregation, the same rank is achieved by Brazil according to the Rawlsian 
aggregation. On the bottom side of the rank (i.e. better performance due to lower loss values)  
is placed Norway when using the Bentham aggregation and Finland when using the Rawlsian 
approach.  
Table 4. Societal Loss of BLI   
country 
taxicab norm  Euclidean  
Bentham Rawls Bentham Rawls 
Australia 20.21 35 7.33 11.18 
Austria 18.30 33 6.48 10.44 
Belgium 20.03 34 7.26 11.05 
Brazil 24.61 45 9.10 14.46 
Canada 17.36 38 6.50 11.83 
                                                     
5 As long as the form of the individual loss function is concerned, we do not observe relevant differences 
among the results generated using the different assumptions. Indeed, the rank correlations between the 
taxicab and Euclidean function is 0.99 with the Benthamian aggregation, and it is 0.96 with the Rawlsian 
aggregation (see tab A1 in the Appendices). Therefore, different sensitivities in observing a policy 
outcome different from the individually preferred one are not relevant to this respect. However, the 
aggregation technique – and the underlying system of values - are more relevant to the final ranks, 
indeed the rank correlation between the Benthamian and Rawlsian aggregation is 0.72 with taxicab 
norm and 0.85 with the Euclidean function (see tab A1 in the Appendices). 
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Chile 22.51 39 8.53 13.23 
Czech Republic 21.88 34 7.91 11.75 
Denmark 18.63 34 6.85 10.86 
Estonia 23.72 41 8.74 13.53 
Finland 17.44 32 6.47 10.25 
France 17.46 36 6.54 11.49 
Germany 17.24 34 6.41 10.95 
Greece 22.39 35 8.38 12.37 
Hungary 23.02 36 8.47 12.29 
Iceland 20.66 35 7.73 11.79 
Ireland 19.23 35 6.87 11.18 
Israel 19.83 36 7.38 12.00 
Italy 22.13 39 8.19 12.21 
Japan 20.55 33 7.67 10.82 
Korea 24.00 36 8.73 12.25 
Luxembourg 21.77 33 7.78 10.82 
Mexico 26.81 39 9.73 13.56 
Netherlands 19.59 35 7.35 11.62 
New Zealand 18.83 32 6.84 10.39 
Norway 16.79 33 6.23 10.44 
Poland 26.10 41 9.30 13.15 
Portugal 21.50 33 8.03 11.45 
Russia 25.17 45 9.01 14.39 
Slovak Republic 23.17 34 8.52 11.58 
Slovenia 16.96 34 6.39 10.86 
Spain 21.88 40 8.14 13.11 
Sweden 20.70 33 7.46 10.77 
Switzerland 20.87 35 7.58 11.62 
Turkey 27.53 46 9.99 14.83 
United Kingdom 18.72 34 6.69 10.68 
United States 23.59 43 8.37 13.38 
                                 Source: authors’ analysis on data from OECD.  
An extensive discussion of the loss and of the related ranking achieved by each country goes 
beyond the scope of the current analysis. Nonetheless, in what follows we conjecture that the 
‘voice’ aspect of the democratic processes ongoing in the considered countries can positively 
influence the way the final observed outcome in terms of mix of well-being indicators reflects 
citizens’ preferences on the same matter. Next section addresses this issue.  
 
4.2. Comparisons among different indexes of ‘voice’ 
In the economic theory the distance between the individual optimal mix of well-being and the 
mix provided by the policy makers results from two main forces: the voice and the mobility 
(Tiebout, 1956; Downs, 1957; Hirschman, 1970). In other words, people that are unhappy with 
the mix of well-being provided by policy makers can change their situation either by voting 
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for another policy maker, by a revolution, or by changing country (Hirschman, 1970). 
Therefore, the differences in the mismatching between individual and country-level mix can 
be explained by the balance of the operating of these forces. In this section we explore to what 
extent the mismatching between the individual optimal mix and the policy maker mix can be 
explained in terms lack of involvement of citizens in the decisions. 
To this end we show the relation between our societal loss function and some proxies of 
quality of democracy provided by the international institutions. We choose three different 
indicators to measure the quality of the democracy: the index of ‘Freedom to make life 
choices’, and the index of ‘Democratic Quality’, both provided by World Happiness Index 
(Helliwell et al. 2016); and the ‘Voice Index’ provided by the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann et a. 2011). Table A1 in the Appendices shows  that there is significant 
negative correlation between our estimated loss functions and any voice index taken into 
account. Indeed, the correlation between the index of ‘Freedom to make life choices’ and our 
loss function is -0.53, -0.58, -0.35, and -0.51, using respectively taxicab Bentham, Euclidean 
Bentham, taxicab Rawls, and Euclidean Rawls. The correlation between the index of 
‘Democratic Quality’ and our loss function is -0.66, -0.68, -0.70, -0.77, using respectively taxicab 
Bentham, Euclidean Bentham, taxicab Rawls, and Euclidean Rawls. The correlation between 
the ‘Voice Index’ is -0.72, -0.74, -0.57, -0.66, using respectively taxicab Bentham, Euclidean 
Bentham, taxicab Rawls, and Euclidean Rawls. These results reveal that there is a strong 
relation between our societal loss function and the lack in the quality of the democracy. This 
proves that our approach can be considered as a valuable support to understand social 
phenomena and the OECD survey is quite representative. 
Since the correlation between the taxicab and the Euclidean preferences is close to one (see 
Table A1 in the Appendices), for convenience of presentation we are going to use only the 
taxicab preferences in this stage of the analysis. 
We propose a quadrant analysis in order to explore similarities among countries with similar 
level of loss function and voice indices. Figure 1 shows the relation between the estimated loss 
functions and the index of ‘Freedom to make life choices’ (Helliwell et al., 2016). Figures 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5 report two lines representing the respective average values. Since the correlation 
between the two variable is negative (Tab. A1 in the Appendices), the majority of values lay 
on the second and the fourth quadrant. In other words, countries with more (less) societal loss 
function have also less (more) freedom to make life choices. There are some interesting 
exceptions in Figure 1: Israel has less freedom to make life choice, and it has also lower values 
of societal loss function. On the other side, USA, and Poland have high freedom to make life 
choice and quite interestingly also high societal loss function. These evidences may signal that 
in these countries other factors (not included in the BLI) play a relevant rule in the individuals’ 
‘freedom to make life choice’.  
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Figure 1 relation between the societal loss functions of BLI and ‘Freedom to make life choices’ 
(The cross represents the average values)  
  
Figure 2Figure 2 shows the relation between the estimated loss functions and the index of 
‘Democratic Quality’ (Helliwell et al. 2016). Alike the previous case, due to the negative 
correlations between these variables (Tab. A1 in the Appendices), the values tend to 
concentrate into the second and the fourth quadrant. It is worth noticing the presence of  some 
outliers such as, again, Israel that have low democratic quality and also low societal loss of 
well-being and Canada showing high democratic quality and high Rawls societal loss of well-
being. 
Figure 2 relation between the societal loss functions of BLI and ‘Democratic Quality’ (The cross 
represents the average values) 
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Figure 3Figure 3 shows the relation between the estimated loss functions and the ‘Voice Index’ 
(Kaufmann et al. 2011). In terms of robustness, it is worth noticing that although the 
‘Voice Index’ is estimated by another institution, we observe that the big picture is quite 
close to that of Figure 1 and Figure 2. We observe the majority of the values on the 
second and fourth quadrant and almost the same interesting outliers:  Israel, Canada, 
and USA. 
 
Figure 3 relation between the societal loss functions of BLI and ‘Voice Index’ (The cross represents 
the average values) 
   
4.3. The relation between loss function and composite indices of well-being from 
BLI 
In order to study the relation between the amount of well-being and the aforementioned 
mismatching phenomenon, we compute two different composite indices of well-being 
starting from the BLI. The first is the simple average of the indicators, as the original BLI 
proposed by OECD (2011) and the second is an aggregation with the ‘Benefit of Doubt’ as 
proposed in Mizobuchi (2014). A preliminary analysis on the relation between the amount of 
well-being (estimated by BOD and average aggregation) and the societal loss function is 
reported in the correlation matrix A1 in the Appendices. According to Table A1 there is a 
significant negative relation between the two measures, regardless of the aggregation 
technique. We interpret this finding as a tentative evidence that countries with higher levels 
of mismatching are also countries with lower levels of the Better Life Index. To further develop 
this conjecture we plotted our data as reported in Figure 4 that shows the relation between 
the societal loss and the average BLI. Due to the negative relation between well-being and loss 
function, the second and the fourth quadrant are also in this case the most crowded ones. The 
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most interesting cases are USA and Canada with both a high average well-being and a high 
societal loss function. In this case, therefore, we have a high level of well-being that is not 
matching with people preferences as expressed in the BLI. On the other side, we observe that 
in Portugal, despite the lower amount of well-being, the Rawlsian loss function is low.   
Figure 4 relation between the societal loss functions of BLI and the average BLI’ (The cross 
represents the average values) 
 
The major points reported in Figure 4 are confirmed in Figure 5 by changing the 
aggregation technique of well-being.  More in detail, as far as the relation between the 
loss functions and the BOD BLI is concerned, the more relevant outliers are USA 
Poland and Canada with high BLI and high societal loss. On the other side, Portugal 
has both a low BOD BLI and a low Rawlsian loss of BLI. 
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Figure 5 relation between the societal loss functions of BLI and the BOD BLI’ (The cross 
represents the average values) 
  
4.4. The country-level loss function 
This section introduces a new way to measure the well-being on BLI at country-level. One that 
(i) treats all the individuals as a unique global community and (ii) evaluate the policy makers’ 
offer in terms of mix of well-being, on the basis of the global societal favourite country. The 
underlying idea is that each individual has its own favourite country according to the distance 
between its optimal point and the country-level mix. Formally, for each individual the 
favourite country is the country that minimizes her loss function (10), and the least favourite 
country is the country that maximizes her loss function (11). By adopting such a global lens, 
we evaluate the countries on the basis of the share of people that ranks the country first and 
last. 
Table 5 shows the share of 92,968 individuals belonging to the sample collected from the 
OECD website that ranks each country first and last with taxicab and Euclidean loss function. 
On the top side of the rank (second and third column in Table 5) Norway is the favoured 
Country according to the majority of individuals. This result is substantially confirmed with 
both taxicab and Euclidean loss function. Indeed, the 14% of individuals ranks Norway first 
assuming taxicab loss function, and the 20% of individuals ranks Norway first assuming 
Euclidean loss function. Finland and Slovenia register a relatively good ranking placing them 
among the first three countries assuming taxicab loss function. Similarly, Austria and Slovenia 
are placed among the first three countries according to the Euclidean loss function. 
On the bottom side of the rank (fourth and fifth column in Table 5) Turkey is the least favorite 
country by the 36% and the 44% of individuals assuming taxicab and Euclidean loss function, 
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respectively. In the last third positions, there are also Mexico and Brazil, both with the taxicab 
and Euclidean loss function. 
Table 5 Share of individuals ranking the country first and last 
Country 
Favorite Least Favorite  
taxicab Euclidean taxicab Euclidean 
Australia 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Austria 3% 10% 0% 0% 
Belgium 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Brazil 6% 0% 14% 12% 
Canada 5% 8% 0% 0% 
Switzerland 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Chile 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Czech Republic 1% 1% 1% 0% 
Germany 4% 5% 0% 0% 
Denmark 2% 3% 0% 0% 
Spain 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Estonia 0% 0% 2% 1% 
Finland 7% 9% 0% 0% 
France 3% 6% 0% 0% 
United Kingdom 1% 2% 0% 0% 
Greece 1% 0% 1% 2% 
Hungary 0% 0% 3% 2% 
Ireland 1% 3% 0% 0% 
Iceland 2% 1% 1% 0% 
Israel 1% 2% 0% 0% 
Italy 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Japan 1% 0% 2% 0% 
Korea 0% 0% 6% 4% 
Luxembourg 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Mexico 0% 0% 19% 20% 
Netherlands 2% 2% 0% 0% 
Norway 14% 20% 0% 0% 
New Zealand 2% 4% 0% 0% 
Poland 0% 0% 13% 7% 
Portugal 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Russia 0% 0% 8% 5% 
Slovak Republic 0% 0% 2% 2% 
Slovenia 7% 10% 0% 0% 
Sweden 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Turkey 0% 0% 36% 44% 
United States 2% 1% 13% 2% 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper addressed the issue of whether and to what extent real people’s preferences among 
different dimensions of a multidimensional measure of well-being match with the wellbeing 
mix effectively registered in the OECD countries as captured by the Better Life Index 
framework. The OECD BLI is particularly suitable for this kind of analysis because it is one of 
the largest dataset collecting well-being data at country level. Moreover, OECD provides a 
survey of the user weightings related to 11 different topics. By using these data, we interpret 
the country-level citizens’ individual weightings as the optimal subjective mix of well-being, 
and we interpret the country-level values of the topics as the mix of well-being provided by 
policy makers. According to these assumptions, we assess the societal loss of well-being at 
country-level by estimating the distance between these mixes for each country included in the 
OECD survey.  
To the best of our knowledge, for the first time, a multidimensional spatial model of 
preferences is used in the well-being context. In our model, the OECD countries are objects of 
preferences. These preferences are expressed as points in the Euclidean K-dimensional space 
in which each dimension is a specific aspect of well-being. Each individual/voter is 
characterized by her/his ideal point in the aforementioned space. Then, for each individual, 
the distance between its optimal mix of well-being and the mix provided by policy makers 
can be interpreted as individual loss in well-being. Therefore, the countries are judged as good 
as they are close to the voters’ ideal point. 
The main results based on the novel methodology are that the highest societal losses are 
registered in Turkey, Mexico, and Brazil. While the lowest societal losses are in Norway and 
in Finland. By comparing our estimated societal losses and some proxies of ‘voice’ provided 
by different source of data (Helliwell et al. 2016, Kaufmann et al. 2011), it emerges that 
countries with lower levels democracy are also countries with higher levels of societal loss of 
well-being. Therefore, the detected mismatching between will of the people and policy 
makers’ activity may be due to lack of citizens’ involvement in the decisions making process. 
Moreover, by comparing the societal loss function and the BLI it emerges that countries with 
more mismatching are also countries with less Better Life Index. 
Appendices 
 
Table A1, Rank Correlation Matrix with confidence intervals (95 % bootstrap upper and lower 
bounds) 
 A B C D E F G H I L 
A 1          
LB 0.982          
B 0.991 1         
UB 0.995          
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LB 0.504 0.508         
C 0.714 0.717 1        
UB 0.845 0.846         
LB 0.700 0.736 0.899        
D  0.836 0.857 0.948 1       
UB 0.914 0.925 0.973        
LB -0.732 -0.765 -0.611 -0.721       
E -0.531 -0.582 -0.353 -0.514 1      
UB -0.246 -0.314 -0.028 -0.223       
LB -0.813 -0.822 -0.835 -0.876 0.364      
F -0.661 -0.676 -0.698 -0.769 0.619 1     
UB -0.425 -0.446 -0.480 -0.589 0.787      
LB -0.721 -0.743 -0.570 -0.657 0.504 0.185     
G -0.515 -0.548 -0.297 -0.419 0.714 0.484 1    
UB -0.224 -0.267 0.035 -0.105 0.845 0.701     
LB -0.852 -0.857 -0.830 -0.874 0.294 0.840 0.211    
H -0.726 -0.736 -0.689 -0.766 0.568 0.916 0.505 1   
UB -0.523 -0.538 -0.466 -0.585 0.755 0.956 0.715    
LB -0.741 -0.769 -0.731 -0.802 0.086 0.447 0.029 0.457   
I -0.544 -0.590 -0.529 -0.643 0.403 0.676 0.354 0.683 1  
UB -0.263 -0.324 -0.243 -0.399 0.646 0.822 0.612 0.826   
LB -0.856 -0.883 -0.741 -0.846 0.537 0.628 0.534 0.685 0.658  
L -0.734 -0.781 -0.546 -0.717 0.736 0.793 0.734 0.828 0.811 1 
UB -0.535 -0.608 -0.265 -0.509 0.857 0.890 0.856 0.909 0.900  
Bootstrap with 1000 replicates, using R package by Herve´ (2015) 
Note: LB=Lower Bound, UB =Upper Bond, A=taxicab Bentham, B=Euclidean Bentham, C=taxicab Rawls, 
D=Euclidean Rawls, E= Freedom to make life choices 2008-2015, F= Democratic Quality 2008-2014, G=World 
Happiness Index 2016, H= Voice Index WB, I=BOD BLI, L=Average BLI 
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